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Abstract	The	dichotomy	between	‘truth’	and	‘falsity’	in	relation	to	memory	is	difficult	to	clearly	sustain.	The	veridicality	of	memory	is	typically	established	by	drawing	on	the	local,	normative	procedures	that	operate	in	a	given	setting	(e.g.	legal,	clinical,	social).	Since	all	procedures	are	strictly	relative,	all	memories	are	technically	either	‘relatively	falsified’	or	‘relatively	as-yet-unfalsified’.	False	Memory	Studies	claim	to	be	able	explain	the	production	of	false	memories,	but	do	not	offer	criterion	to	effectively	differentiate	populations	of	so-called	‘true’	and	‘false’	victims.	The	narrative	of	the	discovery	of	the	‘false	memories’	themselves	is	inconsistent	and	demonstrates	a	significant	level	of	imagination	inflation	and	suggestibility	to	dominant	narratives	in	post-war	Psychology.	In	attending	to	the	setting-specificity	of	memory,	researchers	may	wish	to	consider	how	their	work	impacts	on	the	experience-ecologies	to	which	they	contribute	
Introduction	A	sixteen	year-old	young	man	is	convicted	of	participating	in	the	brutal	rape	and	murder	of	woman,	along	with	his	uncle.	His	conviction	relies,	in	part,	on	a	confession	he	has	made	during	the	course	of	questioning	by	police	investigators.	He	later	recants	on	his	confession.	Filmed	footage	of	the	police	interviews,	conducted	without	the	presence	of	a	lawyer	or	family	member,	appear	to	show	the	investigators	guiding	and	shaping	a	narrative	for	the	young	man.	At	times	they	provide	crucial	details	that	they	ask	him	to	confirm.	Much	of	what	he	is	taken	to	remember	consists	of	agreeing	with	statements	that	are	put	to	him.	A	twenty-eight	year	old	woman	writes	an	open	letter	to	a	national	newspaper	accusing	her	stepfather	of	sexually	abusing	her	when	she	was	a	seven	year-old	child.	This	is	not	the	first	time	she	has	made	these	allegations.	They	originally	appeared	in	the	context	of	the	divorce	between	her	stepmother	and	stepfather.	No	criminal	charges	were	brought	at	the	time.	The	letter	followed	the	publicity	around	a	professional	award	given	to	her	stepfather,	a	well-known	public	figure.	The	woman	seeks	to	make	plain	what	she	sees	as	a	very	different	side	to	the	man,	which	has,	she	claims,	been	deliberately	and	systematically	ignored	by	his	peers.	A	young	man	in	his	early	twenties	is	shown	a	picture	by	a	psychologist	that	shows	him	as	a	child	taking	part	in	a	hot	air	balloon	ride	and	asked	what	he	can	remember	of	the	event.	The	photograph	is	a	fake,	which	has	been	digitally	constructed	out	of	real	photographs	provided	by	the	man’s	parent.	The	man	initially	claims	not	to	remember	anything	about	that	day.	But	under	the	structured	guidance	of	the	psychologist,	they	gradually	assemble	some	details.	Over	a	series	of	interviews,	these	details	are	carefully	pulled	together	to	form	a	narrative	of	an	event	that,	to	the	best	knowledge	of	both	the	man	and	his	parent,	did	not	actually	occur.	
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What	do	these	three	vignettes	have	in	common?	What	do	they	tell	us	about	memory	and	the	process	of	remembering?	The	first	comes	from	the	case	of	Brendan	Dassey,	featured	in	the	documentary	Making	a	Murderer,	which	focuses	on	the	case	against	his	uncle	Steven	Avery	around	the	murder	of	Teresa	Halbach.	The	second	describes	the	allegations	publicly	made	by	Dylan	Farrow	about	her	stepfather	Woody	Allen.	The	third	is	taken	from	the	description	of	an	experiment	conducted	by	Kimberley	Wade	and	colleagues	at	Victoria	University	of	Wellington	(Wade,	Garry,	Read	&	Lindsay,	2002).	Three	very	different	sets	of	events,	taking	place	at	different	times	and	places,	and	under	vastly	different	circumstances.	Yet	all	appear	to	suggest	something	about	the	complex	and	contested	relationship	between	what	is	remembered	and	the	nature	or	indeed	the	existence	of	the	actual	events	themselves.	They	suggest	the	possibility	of	‘false	memory’.		Or	at	least,	that	is	one	interpretation.	Here	are	some	others.	Each	of	these	cases	occurs	when	the	person	concerned	interacts	with	some	form	of	institutional	practice	(i.e.	the	judicial	system,	the	media,	university	based	research).	What	is	remembered	takes	place	following	the	person	being	confronted	with	evidence	or	propositions	(i.e.	accusations,	solicitations,	implicit	suggestions)	that	they	either	do	not	entirely	understand	or	which	are	outside	of	their	control,	due	to	their	status	as	either	a	vulnerable	adult,	a	self-identified	‘survivor’,	or	being	confronted	with	scientific	‘expertise’.	The	power	to	manage	and	control	the	situation	clearly	lies	with	the	institution	and	its	representatives	(i.e.	investigators,	reporters,	experimenters)	in	a	way	that	is	tangible	to	the	participants.		Alternatively,	another	thread	running	through	all	the	cases	is	the	actual	or	suspected	betrayal	of	the	person	by	a	close	family	member.	In	Brendan	Dassey’s	case,	it	is	the	suspected	actions	of	his	uncle	that	have	led	to	him	to	be	taken	from	school	into	the	bewildering	and	threatening	atmosphere	of	the	criminal	justice	system.	For	Dylan	Farrow,	the	central	felt	betrayal	concerns	her	stepfather,	which	is	then	compounded,	for	her,	by	refusal	of	his	peers	–	some	of	whom	she	knows	personally	–	to	take	her	allegations	seriously.	And	although	the	stakes	are	somewhat	different	for	the	participants	in	Wade’s	experiments,	the	alternatives	before	them	are	to	either	accept	that	their	own	memory	is	at	fault	or	to	confront	the	challenging	and	perplexing	idea	that	their	parent	would	collude	with	an	hitherto	unknown	professional	to	create	a	situation	where	they	would	be	potentially	embarrassed	or	humiliated.		Finally,	what	all	of	these	cases	show	us	is	the	fraught	relationship	we	all	have	to	the	past	that	we	strive	to	remember.	The	central	problem	in	the	Steven	Avery	case	is	that	the	details	of	what	actually	happened	in	the	murder	of	Teresa	Halbach	have	become	less	rather	than	more	clear	in	the	course	of	huge	efforts	to	secure	and	maintain	a	conviction.	Brendan’s	memories	have	been	subject	to	repeated	construction	and	deconstruction	by	the	legal-investigative	processes	in	which	he	is	caught	up,	with	the	result	that	at	the	time	of	writing	his	conviction	had	been	overturned	Federal	Court.	Similarly,	Dylan’s	recollection	has	been	the	object	of	contestation	through	a	whole	series	of	subsequent	events	and	public	conflicts	(e.g.	her	step-parents	divorce	and	the	ensuing	publicity).	Whilst	Wade’s	participants	have	not	had	to	endure	such	dramatic	circumstances,	their	pasts	are	
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no	less	uncertain.	Perhaps	there	really	was	a	balloon	ride	that	went	undocumented	and	has	been	forgotten	by	the	parents.	Or	perhaps	entertaining	uncertainty	around	this	event	threatens	to	corrode	the	memorial	scaffolding	on	which	their	family	relationships	are	built.	Taking	any	of	these	three	cases	as	exemplars	for	a	clear	dichotomy	between	‘truth’	and	‘falsity’	in	memory	seems	rather	problematic.	The	question	we	want	to	open	up	in	this	paper	is	what	is	actually	accomplished	through	the	use	of	the	term	‘false	memory’.	How	does	this	term	enhance	our	understanding	of	the	situated	and	contextual	dynamics	wherein	the	past	is	collaboratively	invoked	and	put	to	work	in	the	present.	After	all,	as	Elizabeth	Loftus,	one	of	the	key	contributors	to	the	field	has	observed	–	‘In	essence,	all	memory	is	false	to	some	degree’	(Bernstein	&	Loftus,	2009,	p.373).	Our	argument	is	that	rather	than	bringing	us	closer	to	the	practices	where	recollections	are	offered	and	contested,	the	notion	of	false	memory	actually	estranges	and	displaces	the	things	we	would	want	to	understand.	We	call	instead	for	an	attention	to	the	setting-specificity	of	remembering,	where	memory	is	approached	as	a	property	of	jointly-managed	activities	that	occur	in	a	definite	time	and	place,	and	which	have	their	own	distinct	norms	and	procedures	as	to	what	constitutes	‘truth’	and	‘falsity’	(see	Brown	&	Reavey,	2015).	Applying	this	approach	to	the	psychology	of	memory	itself	allows	us	to	reflexively	question	the	complex	relationship	that	psychologists	have	to	the	history	of	the	discipline	in	which	they	are	formed	and	located.	
Relatively	Falsified	Memories	A	good	starting	place	is	with	the	distinction	between	truth	and	falsity	on	which	the	conceptualization	of	‘false	memory’	stands.	As	commonsense,	everyday	terms,	‘true’	and	‘false’	are	used	a	huge	variety	of	ways.	We	can	point	to	just	a	few	of	these	to	demonstrate.	As	technical	terms,	they	mark	whether	a	prior	statement	fits	within	what	is	taken	to	be	the	legitimate	frame	of	reference	(‘that	is	a	false’).	As	rhetorical	terms,	they	indicate	the	extent	to	which	there	is	an	alignment	of	opinion	between	speakers	(‘what	you	say	is	true	insofar	as…’).	As	
ethical	terms,	they	indicate	whether	there	is	a	proper	moral	continuity	expressed	in	the	actions	of	someone	or	something	(‘a	false	prophet’).	And	as	political	terms	they	express	a	desire	to	unwind	ideology	from	perception	or	debate	(‘speaking	truth	to	power).	Clearly	there	are	many	other	usages.	Because	of	the	inherent	diversity	and	contradictions	in	usage,	it	is	important	to	be	clear	on	just	what	‘false’	means	in	relation	to	memory.	Presumably	this	falls	somewhere	within	the	technical	domain.	A	false	memory	is	one	that	deviates	from	the	range	of	expected	accounts	of	some	given	prior	event.	But	this	merely	displaces	the	judgment,	since	it	then	requires	us	to	properly	state	how	these	‘expected	accounts’	were	arrived	at,	what	forms	of	evidence	are	deemed	to	be	relevant	and	the	procedures	that	were	used	to	evaluate	them.	So	whilst	‘truth’	and	‘false’	are	the	commonsense	terms	used	in	delivering	this	verdict,	the	judgment	itself	refers	to	a	normative	application	of	prior	criterion	and	standards.	Moreover,	since	access	to	the	full	range	of	historical	data	on	which	a	given	recollection	is	based	may	typically	not	be	available	(think	again	of	whether	or	
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not	we	are	able	to	say	definitively	that	a	given	event	did	or	did	not	happen),	then	the	normative	judgment	is	tentative	and	provisional.	This	way	of	thinking	about	truth	resonates	with	what	the	philosopher	Martin	Heidegger	(2013)	referred	to	as	‘correctness’.	For	example,	the	statement	‘this	is	true	gold’	does	not	express	anything	of	the	essential	nature	of	what	gold	is,	but	rather	reflects	a	normative	judgment	based	on	whatever	criterion	are	in	play	within	the	practice	where	the	statement	is	uttered.	‘True	gold’	for	the	merchant	or	the	banker	may	be	established	by	procedures	such	as	weighing	or	markers	of	external	verification	(e.g.	hallmarks),	whereas	‘true	gold’	for	the	chemist	or	physicist	may	require	calculation	of	atomic	mass	and	chemical	testing.	Referring	to	these	matters	as	‘correctness’	allows	Heidegger	to	disentangle	situated	cultural-historical	technical	judgments	from	a	broader	sense	of	the	truth.	This,	for	Heidegger	originates	in	the	Greek	term	‘aletheia’,	which	he	translates	as	‘disclosure’	or	‘unconcealment’	and	which	refers	to	the	temporal	process	by	which	things	come	into	appearance	in	the	world.	This	process	implies	both	that	there	are	aspects	to	the	world	that	are	not	given	at	once,	but	are	rather	emergent,	and	that	what	is	disclosed	depends	substantially	on	the	situated	nature	of	our	engagements	with	events.		This	expanded	version	of	truth	has	a	projectful	character	that	comes	freighted	with	ethical	commitments.	It	is	our	duty	to	follow	truth	as	an	always	emergent,	incomplete	process	where	things	are	always	differing	from	the	ways	in	which	we	first	encountered	them.	By	contrast,	the	narrow	technical	version	insists	on	a	stability	of	identity	and	that	things	conform	with	the	way	we	want	them	to	be.	It	is	the	conflation	of	these	two	senses	that	allows	those	who	would	seek	to	impose	their	own	technical	procedures	beyond	the	domain	of	their	normative	application	to	cloak	themselves	in	the	moral	guise	as	‘defenders	of	truth’,	and	conversely	those	who	do	not	adhere	to	those	procedures	as	‘unreliable’	or	‘true	believers’	(see	Campbell,	2003).	To	avoid	this,	we	would	suggest	replacing	the	terms	‘true’	and	‘false’	with	those	that	are	better	fitted	to	the	procedural	and	normative	aspect	of	judging	memory.	Let	us	be	clear	that	we	are	not	arguing	against	the	possibility	of	establishing	whether	a	given	recollection	can	be	judged	to	be	sufficiently	accurate	or	not.	Quite	the	reverse:	this	matter	is	so	crucial	that	we	need	to	overcome	the	unhelpful	allusions	that	attach	to	notions	of	‘truth’	and	‘falsity’.	We	propose	that	recollections	that	do	not	map	onto	normatively	established	criterion	of	correctness	ought	properly	to	be	called	‘relatively	falsified	memories’,	where	the	modifier	relative	refers	to	the	situated	nature	of	the	judgment.	Recollections	that	do	pass	this	test	are	not,	by	default,	‘true’,	since	this	implies	the	existence	of	a	further	set	of	unspecified	procedures	for	complete	verification.	In	the	case	of	Wade’s	experiments	this	would	amount	to	something	like	a	full	forensic	investigation	of	the	complete	life-history	of	the	participants	which	was	able	to	eliminate	beyond	any	reasonable	doubt	that	no	balloon	ride	had	ever	been	made.	Instead	‘correct’	memories	should	be	termed	‘as-yet-unfalsified	memories’.		But	to	arrive	at	these	more	refined	categories	would	require	further	investigation	into	the	actual	procedures	for	partial	verification	that	are	used	in	a	given	setting.	For	example,	Elizabeth	Loftus’	well-known	Lost	in	the	Mall	
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experiment	(see	Loftus	&	Pickrell,	1995),	developed	the	procedure	later	used	by	Wade	et	al	of	using	information	supplied	by	family	members	as	the	basis	for	facilitating	‘false	memories’.	In	doing	so,	the	experimenters	essentially	based	their	falsification	procedure	on	trust	in	this	initial	information.	It	seems	that	at	no	point	did	they	question	the	accuracy	of	the	family	member’s	memories,	despite	the	inherent	mistrust	of	personal	experience	that	permeates	the	approach.	A	crucial	question	is	whether	or	not	research	of	this	kind	is	able	to	demonstrate	that	it	is	not	vulnerable	to	precisely	the	kinds	of	external	influences	that	it	purports	to	study	(see	Motzkau	2009	on	suggestibility	research).		A	further	issue	is	with	the	reasoning	that	underpins	the	division	of	true	and	false.	In	a	summary	of	the	state	of	the	field	in	2003,	Loftus	claims:	Collectively,	researchers	have	learned	a	great	deal	about	how	false	memories	develop	and	are	almost	at	the	point	of	being	able	to	write	a	recipe.	First,	the	individual	gets	convinced	that	the	false	event	is	plausible.	Even	events	that	start	out	being	rather	implausible	can	be	made	to	seem	more	plausible	by	simple	suggestion.	Next,	the	individual	gets	convinced	that	the	false	event	was	personally	experienced.	Plying	the	person	with	false	feedback	is	a	particularly	effectively	way	to	accomplish	this.	At	this	point,	the	individual	might	merely	believe	that	the	event	is	true	but	have	no	sense	of	recollection.	But	with	guided	imagination,	with	visualization	of	the	stories	of	others,	and	with	suggestive	feedback	and	other	sorts	of	manipulation,	a	rich	false	memory	can	occur.	(Loftus,	2003,	p.871)	This	seems	at	first	glance	quite	a	promising	model.	Constructing	plausibility	creates	the	fertile	field	in	which	additional	misinformation	can	take	hold,	which	is	then	elaborated	by	adding	visualization	and	suggested	perceptual	experiences	resulted	in	the	ultimate	implantation	of	a	‘rich	false	memory’.	However,	the	sorts	of	target	‘false	memories’	which	have	been	the	longstanding	object	of	the	field,	and	indeed	the	source	of	the	term	‘false	memory’	in	the	first	place,	are	those	where	adults	remember	extreme,	traumatic	experiences,	typically	of	rape	or	sexual	violence	during	childhood	that	are	subsequently	not	verified	through	legal	or	other	procedures	(or	may	sometimes	be	retracted)	(Campbell,	2003).	It	must	be	said	that	these	kinds	of	cases	are	comparatively	rare	when	set	against	the	number	of	cases	where	some	form	of	verification	is	possible,	and	the	further	‘file	drawer’	set	of	cases	that	are	never	brought	because	of	concerns	around	the	legal	process.	The	Loftus	model	seeks	to	explain	this	small	number	of	cases	by	beginning	with	a	far	broader	general	population	and	then	probabilistically	states	how,	from	an	initial	condition,	each	step	may	lead	to	the	formation	of	a	false	memory.	The	trouble	with	this	kind	of	reasoning	is	that	it	overlooks	the	conditional	probabilities	that	are	involved.	If	one	were	really	committed	to	understanding	the	difference	between	what	Loftus	(2003,	p.871)	calls	‘false	victims’	and	‘true	victims’,	then	properly	speaking	the	approach	ought	to	be	‘given	the	existence	of	
an	allegation	of	abuse,	what	factors	distinguish	the	classes	of	‘true’	and	‘false’?’	rather	than	‘what	factors	lead	probabilistically	from	initial	conditions	to	the	final	
outcome?’.	The	difference	between	these	approaches	is	significant,	in	both	a	logical	and	a	statistical	sense.	The	approach	taken	in	false	memory	research	
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starts	with	the	general	and	tries	to	work	its	way	down	a	quasi-causal	pathway	to	the	particular.	Whereas	beginning	from	actually	occurring	events,	defining	discrete	populations	around	those	events	and	looking	to	factors	that	distinguish	those	populations	from	one	another	eliminates	much	speculative	reasoning.		For	example,	in	the	previous	citation,	Loftus	draws	upon	a	mélange	of	ideas	to	build	a	conceptual	bridge	from	the	general	to	the	particular,	including	the	misinformation	paradigm,	imagination	inflation,	suggestibility	research,	guided	imagery/vizualisation	studies	and	more.	But	even	this	heavily	over-egged	theoretical	recipe	can’t	quite	reach	its	intended	target	because,	crucially,	at	no	point	is	it	able	to	show	the	actual	implantation	of	memories	of	childhood	sexual	abuse.	These	are	probabilistically	implied	rather	than	demonstrated.	So	strictly	speaking	we	must	say	that	what	is	being	studied	is	not	the	same	thing	as	a	‘false	memory	of	childhood	abuse’.	But	if	the	research	were	to	begin	with	the	actual	joint	occurrence	of	allegations	of	abuse	with	either	support	or	falsification,	then	meaningful	questions	as	to	whether,	say,	‘imagination	inflation’	distinguished	the	actual	populations	–	and	therefore	had	any	explanatory	value	at	all	–	could	be	posed.	It	is	our	suspicion	that	very	little	of	what	is	in	Loftus’	recipe	would	differentiate	the	populations,	and	that	other	factors	such	as	history	of	engagement	with	social-welfare	services,	social	and	economic	conditions	or	co-presence	of	other	forms	of	emotional	abuse,	might	be	better	candidates.		
The	Formation	of	False	Memory	Research	So	if	false	memory	research	does	not	actually	demonstrate	the	implantation	of	‘false	memories	of	child	sexual	abuse’,	then	what	can	we	say	about	what	it	does	show	and	the	way	it	arrives	at	those	demonstrations?	As	befitting	someone	who	is	now	at	the	apex	of	their	career,	Loftus	has	published	numerous	overviews	of	the	development	of	the	field	and	the	centrality	of	her	role	(e.g.	Loftus,	2013;	Loftus,	2000;	Loftus	&	Ketcham,	1995).	The	narrative	typically	begins	with	her	well-known	work	on	eyewitness	memory	in	the	1970s,	which	established	experimentally	the	power	of	providing	misinformation	on	subsequent	recall	of	films	of	traffic	accidents	(see	Loftus,	1979).	This	work	occurs	at	a	pivotal	point	in	the	recent	history	of	psychology.	It	is	the	moment	where	the	cognitive	paradigm	is	beginning	to	achieve	a	degree	of	systematization,	pulling	together	parts	of	information	theory	with	systems	theory,	cybernetics	and	analytical	philosophy.		Dupuy	(2000)	has	argued	that	the	particular	way	in	which	cybernetics	was	mobilized	was	decisive.	Analytical	approaches	from	philosophy	of	mind	became	wedded	to	the	approach,	with	the	effect	of	erasing	questions	of	reasons	and	meaning.	Difficult	philosophical	notions	such	as	intentionality	became	operationalized	in	a	reductive	manner	as	matters	of	feedback	and	information	processing,	following	Weiner’s	(1948)	original	proposed	solution.	The	outcome	is	what	Dupuy	calls	a	‘mechanization’	of	the	mind.	Loftus’	work	embraced	this	mechanization	in	the	case	of	memory,	since	it	holds	out	the	possibility	of	not	simply	representing	the	processes	putatively	involved,	but	also	of	enabling	intervention.	A	mechanized	mind	is	also	one	that	is	malleable.	The	particular	form	of	intervention	that	Loftus	envisaged	was	in	relation	to	the	law.	Her	working	assumption	at	the	time	appears	to	be	that	since	the	justice	system	requires	confidence	in	the	testimony	provided	by	witnesses,	it	is	the	role	
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of	the	psychologist	to	demonstrate	the	conditions	under	which	that	confidence	might	be	undermined	through	phenomenon	such	as	suggestion,	misinformation,	distortion	etc	(see	Loftus	&	Ketcham,	1992).	This	is	a	somewhat	peculiar	way	of	posing	the	problem	–	surely	questions	of	justice	are	better	formed	in	terms	of	recognizing	how	to	elicit	and	recognize	those	things	and	persons	who	stand	in	need	of	reparation?	That	is,	how	to	create	rather	than	dissolve	confidence	in	legal	testimony.	Loftus’	initial	orientation	to	this	problem	makes	clear	why	much	of	her	work	makes	reference	to	the	tradition	of	‘skepticism’.	However,	what	is	missing	here	is	an	awareness	that	historically	skepticism	emerged	out	of	a	critique	of	existing	authorities	and	power	–	it	is	a	weapon	of	the	weak	that	uses	reason	against	brute	force,	not	a	further	cudgel	through	which	the	powerful	can	further	buttress	themselves	against	potential	claimants	(see	Stengers,	2000)	The	use	of	skepticism	as	a	means	of	supporting	rather	than	critiquing	existing	social	and/or	political	arrangements	certainly	fits	with	how	some	dialects	of	psychology,	particularly	in	the	USA,	have	seen	the	role	of	the	discipline	post-1945.	Nevertheless,	it	is	extraordinary	to	propose,	as	Loftus	has	done	recently,	that	a	legitimate	application	of	false	memory	research	would	be	to	engage	in	the	of	implanting	false	memories	in	order	to	influence	dietary	choices	as	part	of	a	social	programme	against	the	‘obesity	epidemic’	(Bernstein,	Pernat	and	Loftus,	2011).	Even	when	her	work	has	identified	with	a	‘vulnerable’	group,	such	as	families	accused	of	historical	sexual	abuse	by	adult	children	(e.g.	members	of	the	False	Memory	Syndrome	Foundation),	the	strategy	has	been	to	support	their	efforts	to	dismiss	the	claims	made	against	them	by	those	who	identify	as	victims	rather	than	attempting	to	understand	the	material	and	psychological	conditions	under	which	a	family	might	collapse	into	serious	open	conflict.		Critics	of	the	kind	of	experimental	psychology	of	memory	that	Loftus	has	pioneered	typically	bemoan	its	obsession	with	accuracy	rather	than	with	the	contexts	in	which	remembering	occurs	(e.g.	Middleton	&	Brown,	2005).	But	in	actuality,	accuracy	is	never	really	the	concern	in	false	memory	research	–	the	focus	is	on	the	impairment	of	accuracy,	or	the	production	of	error.	Because	of	this,	there	is	little	to	be	found	in	this	work	that	assists	in	the	project	of	improving	confidence	in	memory,	of	supporting	the	vulnerable	in	making	sense	of	what	they	remember.	Arguably,	the	participants	in	a	variant	of	the	Lost	in	the	Mall	or	the	Fake	Balloon	Ride	study	don’t	really	learn	anything	that	would	help	them	in	relation	to	their	own	autobiographical	memories,	other	than	not	to	trust	either	experimental	psychologists	or	their	own	family	members.		One	possibility	here	might	be	to	see	that	many	of	the	problems	stem	from	what	Dupuy	(2000)	calls	the	‘unhappy	accident’	where	psychologists	bought	into	the	wrong	combination	of	cybernetics	and	philosophy.	Consider,	for	example,	the	kind	of	speculative	theories	of	alcoholism	and	‘schizophrenia’	that	Gregory	Bateson	(1973)	–	one	of	the	key	figures	in	the	Macy	conferences	which	became	the	foundations	of	modern	cognitive	science	–	developed	by	taking	an	‘open	systems’	version	of	cybernetics	rather	than	a	‘closed	systems’.	Here	the	unit	of	analysis	is	the	family	or	the	group	rather	than	the	individual,	and	the	processes	allow	for	both	learning	and	a	transformation	of	the	functioning	of	the	system	itself.	False	memory	research	is	blind	to	these	open	system	properties.	It	assumes	that	individuals	find	themselves,	for	whatever	reason,	in	some	situation	
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where	they	are	exposed	to	suggestive	misinformation,	which	they	then	incorporate	into	their	autobiographical	memories.	But	very	rarely	do	we	simply	‘arrive’	in	some	setting	without	a	set	of	intentions	or	projects	which	are	relevant	to	what	we	will	do	next.	Moreover,	the	‘implantation’	paradigm	requires	that	the	person	actively	participate	in	the	practice	and	perform	work	on	themselves.	To	do	this	requires	a	reflexive	orientation	to	the	sort	of	person	one	is	and	what	one	wants	to	become.		It	is	the	focus	on	the	capacity	for	turning	around	on	oneself,	in	concert	with	others,	that	is	sorely	lacking	in	false	memory	research.	The	following	words	of	Bartlett	have	often	been	cited	by	those	arguing	for	a	reconstructive	(rather	than	reproductive)	conception	of	memory:	In	a	world	of	constantly	changing	environment,	literal	recall	is	extraordinarily	unimportant.	(Bartlett,	1932,	p.203-4)	This	is	usually	glossed	as	a	claim	for	the	relative	lack	of	importance	of	accuracy	in	recall,	in	favour	of	a	social	orientation	to	remembering	(e.g.	Middleton	&	Brown,	2005).	But	the	full	passage	in	which	these	words	appear	prove	far	more	instructive:	An	organism	which	possesses	so	many	avenues	of	sensory	response	as	man’s,	and	which	lives	in	intimate	social	relationship	with	numberless	other	organisms	of	the	same	kind,	must	find	some	way	in	which	it	can	break	up	this	chronological	order	and	rove	more	or	less	at	will	in	any	order	over	the	events	which	have	built	up	its	present	momentary	‘schemata’.	It	must	find	a	way	of	being	dominantly	determined,	not	by	the	immediately	preceding	reaction,	or	experience,	but	by	some	reaction	or	experience	more	remote	…	We	must,	then,	consider	what	does	actually	happen	more	often	than	not	when	we	say	what	we	remember.	The	first	notion	to	get	rid	of	is	that	memory	is	primarily	or	literally	reduplicative,	or	reproductive.	In	a	world	of	constantly	changing	environment,	literal	recall	is	extraordinarily	unimportant.	(Bartlett,	1932,	p.203-4)	We	take	Bartlett	to	be	arguing	here	that	a	reflexive	orientation	to	what	we	can	remember	is	a	means	of	‘breaking’	with	the	apparent	‘order’	of	the	present	through	using	the	past	as	a	means	of	restructuring	our	relations	to	others	and	the	broader	environment.	To	put	this	in	systems	theory	terms,	memory	enables	a	kind	of	learning	that	allows	the	system	to	overcome	its	own	parameters	and	achieve	a	new	state	that	is	not	simply	predictable	from	the	current	state.		The	standard	narrative	in	false	memory	research	is	that	a	person	somehow	finds	himself	or	herself	in	therapy,	where	they	are	exposed	to	malicious	practices	that	result	in	the	implantation	of	‘false	memories	of	childhood	sexual	abuse’	leading	them	to	accuse	innocent	family	members.	Yet	the	decision	to	enter	therapy	already	indicates	that	this	person	has	begun	to	turn	around	on	their	own	life	history	and	is	seeking	to	find	some	way	of	‘breaking	up	the	chronological	order’	to	transform	themselves.	They	do	this	crucially	not	as	a	wholly	independent,	autonomous	agent	(like	a	closed	system	lacking	in	meaning,	intentions	and	history),	but	rather	as	a	person	embedded	in	a	web	of	relations	that	together	form	an	open	system.	In	a	small	number	of	cases,	clients	do	indeed	claim	to	
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remember	forgotten	episodes	of	abuse	and	confront	family	members.	But	the	idea	of	memory	‘implantation’	is	not	only	unlikely	to	differentiate	this	small	subset	from	the	broader	population	of	clients	who	remember	childhood	sexual	abuse,	it	also	doesn’t	really	assist	in	understanding	the	particular,	contingent	life-histories	that	are	implicated	in	cases	of	‘relatively-falsified	memories’.	Studies	of	‘recovered	memory’	have	shown	that	there	are	very	few	incidences	of	remembering	such	events	with	absolutely	no	existing	memories	or	suspicions	of	some	form	of	abuse	prior	to	therapy	(see	Reavey	&	Warner,	2003).	It	is	therefore	not	simply	a	question	of	switching	from	one	form	of	belief	(‘I	am	unhappy’)	to	another	(‘I	am	a	victim	of	child	sexual	abuse’)	as	a	consequence	of	memory	implantation	or	whatever	else.	To	use	the	parallel	example	of	Brendan	Dassey,	he	seems	to	have	been	aware	during	the	process	of	his	conviction,	that	what	he	remembered	in	one	setting	(e.g.	under	police	interrogation)	was	very	different	to	what	he	remembered	in	other	settings	(e.g.	talking	to	his	mother).	His	problem	then	became	that	of	managing	the	tensions	and	contradictions	between	the	various	accounts.	That	is	to	say,	an	ecological	and	relational	problem	grounded	in	the	various	settings	in	which	his	memories	were	being	solicited	and	contested.	We	can	now	differentiate	two	different	ways	of	thinking	about	the	‘falsity’	of	memory.	In	the	first,	memory	is	property	of	a	mechanised	mind	which	processes	information	from	the	environment	to	arrive	at	states	that	we	can	call	‘beliefs’	that	determine	action.	The	capacity	of	this	closed	system	to	understand	the	relationship	between	information	and	belief	states	–	i.e	self-insight	–	is	somewhat	limited,	hence	it	is	malleable	to	external	manipulation.	In	the	second,	memory	is	the	property	of	an	open	system	that	strives	to	alter	its	relationship	to	the	environment	by	reflexively	turning	around	on	its	own	prior	states	in	order	to	free	itself	from	being	constrained	by	immediate	demands	and	conditions.	When	a	person	recalls	something,	they	do	so	as	part	of	an	open	system	such	that	what	is	remembered	is,	properly	speaking,	the	collaborative	product	of	the	system	rather	than	the	output	of	an	individual	cognitive	system.	In	the	first	mode	of	thought,	falseness	is	a	belief	state	that	is	externally	unverifiable	and	which	is	arrived	at	through	information	distortion.	In	the	second,	falseness	is	a	complex	contingent	process	which	emerges	through	a	reflexive	effort	at	transforming	the	existing	state	of	the	system	and	which	serves	as	the	means	for	‘learning’	to	occur.	This	differentiation	of	modes	of	thought	can	be	usefully	applied	to	the	history	of	false	memory	research	itself.	Scientific	research	can	be	treated	as	the	accumulation	of	more	information,	some	of	it	‘correct’,	other	parts	‘false’.	The	processing	of	this	information	results	in	states	we	can	call	‘theories’	or	‘paradigms’.	At	certain	historical	points,	the	limitations	of	the	system	to	include	specific	kinds	of	environmental	information,	or	to	generate	novelty,	brings	about	a	crisis	in	the	form	of	a	system	re-boot	or	shift	to	a	new	paradigm.	This	is	more	or	less	the	narrative	that	Loftus	offers	in	her	reviews	–	the	successive	gathering	of	more	data,	more	conceptual	pieces	of	the	puzzle,	until	the	‘recipe’	for	making	false	memories	gradually	emerges.		But	there	are	some	significant	gaps	in	this	story.	Things	don't	always	add	up.	For	one,	there	is	the	curious	relationship	that	Loftus’	work	has	to	Freudian	psychoanalysis	(the	very	exemplar	of	unscientific	‘true	belief’	that	false	memory	research	rejects)	(see	Pope,	1995).		Throughout	her	work,	Loftus	has	relied	upon	
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neo-Freudian	notions	of	repression	and	suggestion	to	explain	how	non-conscious	processes	may	be	manipulated.	Whilst	these	are	usually	translated	into	the	argot	of	information	theory,	their	roots	to	a	very	different	tradition	of	practice	and	enquiry	remain.	Equally	intriguing	is	the	genesis	of	the	term	‘false	memory’	itself.	As	Pezdek	&	Lam	(2007)	have	shown,	the	term	gains	some	currency	within	the	experimental	psychological	community	in	the	1990s.	Whilst	conceptually	much	of	the	work	that	emerges	there	is	indebted	to	the	longstanding	tradition	of	suggestibility	research	(see	Motzkau	2009),	the	idea	of	a	thing	called	a	‘false	memory’	owes	more	to	the	formation	and	activities	of	the	False	Memory	Syndrome	Foundation	(FMSF)	in	1992.	It	is	this	group	that	first	defines	the	problem	space	of	‘falseness’	in	memory	in	the	contemporary	sense	of	the	term.	It	is	then	constituted	as	a	social	and	a	political	category,	aligned	with	a	particular	set	of	group	interests,	rather	than	as	a	‘scientific’	category	emerging	from	data,	despite	the	here	purely	rhetorical	use	of	the	medical	term	‘syndrome’.	Loftus’	research	in	the	1990s	then	seeks	to	flesh	out	this	socio-political	category	by	speculatively	mixing	together	data	and	concepts	derived	from	the	very	different	context	and	tradition	of	experimental	psychology.		The	difference	between	this	way	of	developing	research	and	the	‘standard	view’	of	scientific	enquiry	(which	forms	the	basis	for	Loftus’	own	narrative)	can	be	seen	in	the	origins	of	both	the	Lost	in	the	Mall	and	the	Fake	Balloon	Ride	experiments.	The	former	apparently	began	its	life	as	a	thought	experiment	during	a	car	journey	before	becoming	a	‘party	trick’,	and	was	only	actually	performed	under	laboratory	conditions	quite	late	in	its	history	(with	very	minimal	data	at	that)	(see	Ashmore	et	al,	2005).	The	idea	seems	to	be	of	greater	importance	here	than	the	actual	experiment.	Whilst	the	Fake	Balloon	Ride	experiment	does	offer	a	more	substantive	dataset,	it	too	appears	to	be	a	thought	experiment	that	was	waiting	for	the	right	conditions	to	be	demonstrated	rather	than	provoked	by	need	to	make	sense	of	an	emergent	empirical	problem,	based	on	the	acknowledgement	‘we	also	thank	…	Jacquie	Pickrell	(for	her	work	on	a	pilot	version	of	this	method	several	years	ago	when	our	ideas	outpaced	the	available	technology)’	(Wade	et	al,	2002,	p.597).	Things	do	not	then	really	add	up	with	the	narrative	of	gradual	accumulation	of	facts	and	concepts	grounded	in	the	careful	sifting	of	data	such	that	a	clear	explanatory	category	‘false	memory’	emerges.	In	fact,	we	would	have	to	say	that	technically	the	idea	of	the	discovery	of	‘false	memory’	cannot	be	verified	by	the	available	facts,	but	seems	to	be	an	imaginative	elaboration	of	the	events,	which	is	to	say,	in	the	terms	of	the	field,	a	‘false	memory’.	What	makes	more	sense	is	to	treat	the	field	as	a	complex	trajectory	of	contingent	relations	between	the	social,	political	and	the	technical,	that	arrives	at	a	very	partial	and	contested	description	of	the	contextual	dynamics	of	memory	as	part	of	a	shifting	alliance	between	various	groups	of	interests.		
Memory	in	the	Experience	Ecology	Our	description	of	the	contingent	emergence	of	‘false	memory	research’	is	not	intended	as	an	in-principle	or	external	critique.	We	do	not	seek	to	directly	evaluate	this	field	in	comparison	with	some	rival	programme	of	memory	studies.	Our	critique	is	rather	with	the	internal	logic	of	the	approach	and	with	the	
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application	of	its	own	standards	to	its	particular	history.	If	the	claim	is	that	there	are	things	such	as	‘true’	and	‘false’	memories	in	the	world,	which	can	be	identified	purely	in	terms	of	the	putative	psychological	mechanisms	that	distinguish	them,	irrespective	of	the	particular	contexts	in	which	they	occur,	then	this	cannot	be	verified	by	the	available	facts	within	the	field.	In	this	sense,	‘false	memory	research’	is	self-falsifying,	it	constitutes	its	own	critique.	However,	if	we	look	at	the	history	of	the	field	as	a	contingent	and	provisional	set	of	relations,	which	temporarily	align	in	different	ways	to	make	interesting,	contestable	and	contested	propositions,	then	this	can	also	be	mobilised	as	an	approach	to	‘false	memory’.	Imagine	what	might	happen	if	at	various	points	in	the	contingent	history	of	the	field,	the	opposite	branching	were	taken.	For	example,	rather	than	the	closed	systems	approach,	which	leads	to	the	mechanisation	of	mind,	what	if	an	open	systems	approach	had	been	pursued.	This	would	result	in	a	concern	with	the	fluidity	of	relations	between	system	and	environment,	or	out	slightly	differently,	with	the	settings	in	which	remembering	occurs	rather	than	the	individual	per	se.	Rather	than	treat	therapy	or	police	investigations	as	sites	where	‘false	memories’	are	implanted,	we	would	instead	seek	to	understand	the	particular	practices	through	which	accounts	of	the	past	are	collaboratively	constructed	(e.g.	what	sorts	of	actions,	the	kinds	of	social	technologies	in	play,	the	particular	use	of	evidence,	forms	of	reasoning),	along	with	the	specific	criterion	used	to	establish	‘true’	from	‘false’.	Crucially,	we	would	also	want	to	ask	what	functions	and	broader	projects	are	being	enacted	within	the	setting,	how	it	makes	use	of	‘memory’	as	a	means	of	‘breaking	with	the	chronological	order’	by	which	it	might	otherwise	be	determined.	At	the	same	time,	we	might	take	the	different	tack	of	asking	how,	within	a	given	setting,	confidence	is	established	in	relation	to	memory.	For	instance,	many	institutional	settings	have	a	strong	orientation	to	their	own	historicity,	which	they	seek	to	enshrine	and	display	in	various	ways,	such	as	through	explicit	narratives,	iconography	and	even	material	displays	(e.g.	corporate	museums).	Becoming	involved	with	an	institution	means	finding	that	one’s	own	biography	is	now	intertwined	with	that	historicity	in	ways	that	can	become	problematic.	For	example,	when	children	enter	into	adoption	processes,	social	welfare	institutions	effectively	become	the	‘guardians’	of	their	memories,	which	they	address	through	practices	such	as	life-story	work	(see	Brown	&	Reavey,	2008).	We	would	then	want	to	ask	how	memory	can	be	supported	and	facilitated	in	such	settings	rather	than	falsified.	What	this	amounts	to	is	an	analysis	of	the	setting-specificity	of	memory.	True	and	false	are	not	abstract	criterion	which	can	be	applied	following	the	application	of	a	speculative	reasoning	to	any	given	case.	They	are	instead	complex,	contingent	matters	that	only	have	any	meaning	within	particular	setting	in	which	they	can	be	established	(see	Brown	&	Reavey,	2015).	We	do	not	deny	the	importance	of	accuracy.	In	fact,	contrary	to	the	way	that	Bartlett’s	infamous	quote	has	sometimes	been	invoked,	we	would	say	that	accuracy	is	usually	fairly	decisive	in	the	vast	majority	of	settings.	But	it	is	always	a	relative	term.	Verification	and	falsification	are	collaborative	achievements	of	the	settings	as	a	whole,	and	are	typically	provisional	and	subject	to	contest,	since	they	involve	matters	of	power	
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and	authority	indexed	to	the	specific	projects	and	history	of	the	setting	(this	is	what	all	our	opening	three	vignettes	illustrate).		From	this	perspective,	if	one	wanted	to	examine,	say,	why	allegations	of	childhood	sexual	abuse	that	were	relatively	verified	in	one	setting	(e.g.	therapy)	but	were	relatively	falsified	in	another	(e.g.	courts	of	law),	then	a	reasonable	empirical	approach	would	be	to	take	the	population	of	allegations	that	were	both	verified	and	falsified	in	both	settings	(i.e.	not	just	those	that	were	falsified,	but	also	those	that	achieved	relative	verification	across	the	settings)	and	attempt	to	identify	the	particular,	contingent	factors	that	differentiated	the	two	groups.	This	approach	would,	of	course,	have	very	little	to	say	about	the	‘truthfulness’	or	‘falseness’	of	memory	in	general,	but	after	all,	if,	as	Loftus	claims	‘all	memory	is	false	to	some	degree’,	then	such	general	claims	can	scarcely	be	of	any	great	interest.	It	is	the	specific	conditions	under	which	falseness	and	truthfulness	are	established	which	form	both	the	empirical	object,	and	to	some	extent	the	ethical	obligations	of	psychological	research.	As	Loftus	rightly	observes,	as	professionals,	it	is	our	duty	to	take	responsibility	for	the	life	of	the	concepts	that	we	develop	and	the	effects	they	may	have	in	the	broader	world:	mental	health	professionals	and	others	must	be	aware	of	how	greatly	they	can	influence	the	recollection	of	events	and	of	the	urgent	need	for	maintaining	restraint	in	situations	in	which	imagination	is	used	as	an	aid	in	recovering	presumably	lost	memories.	(Loftus,	1997,	p.75)	Psychological	research	is	not	just	about	the	world,	is	is	also	of	the	world.	If	we	think	of	the	ranges	of	culturally	and	historically	situated	ways	of	being	that	are	available	to	persons	at	a	given	place	and	time	as	constituting	something	like	an	
experience-ecology	(see	Brown,	2015),	then	we	can	see	that	as	responsible	professionals	it	is	our	role	to	ensure	that	our	ideas	do	not,	as	far	as	possible,	pollute	that	ecology	or	become	so	virulent	as	to	crowd	out	and	destroy	the	other	forms	of	cognate	experience	which	exist	within	that	ecology.	Experiences	are	contingent,	fragile,	tentative	things	that	sit	in	a	web	of	interdependencies.	We	must	not	breed	monstrous	concepts	that	devour	all	before	and	render	the	ecology	a	barren,	lifeless	place.	
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